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Ethics in Government Act: 
Report and Recommendations 
Introduction 
6 Morality can't be legislated, but behavior can be 
1 
regulated. 6 Thus the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke of 
the need for civil rights laws, and his words apply equally to 
the need for ethics legislation. 
on July 2, 1987, the New York State Legislature passed 
the Ethics in Government Act (the 6 Ethics Act 6 ) and the New York 
Governmental Accountability Audit and Internal Control Act, which 
were signed into law on August 7, 1987. 2 Provisions of the 
legislation go into effect at different times, many as late as 
January 1, 1991. 
1
ouoted in Preyer, #Legislative Ethics,w in Annual Chief 
Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States, 
Ethics and Government 67 (1982). 
2Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404 
(S.6441, A.8528); New York Governmental Accountability Audit and 
Internal Control Act of 1987, ch. 814, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1456. 
The Audit Act confers additional powers upon the State 
Comptroller within the State's accounting system; requires state 
agencies to establish comprehensive internal controls; and 
subjects the Offices of the Governor, Comptroller, and Attorney 
General, as well as the Legislature and the Judiciary, to a 
system of independent audits by certified public accounting firms 
every two years. 
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The Ethics Act covers statewide elected officials, 
state officers and employees, legislators, and legislative 
employees (collectively, "covered individuals") and, for some 
purposes, certain political party chairmen. 3 
The Act, among other things, prohibits covered individ-
uals and political party chairmen from appearing or rendering 
services on behalf of private clients on certain matters before 
state agencies for compensation, and from engaging in various 
business transactions with state . 4 agencies. The Act does not 
prohibit covered individuals and political party chairmen from 
the private counselling of clients on matters before state 
agencies, nor does it in any way restrict appearances by covered 
individuals on behalf of private clients before political subdi-
visions of the State. The Act also requires any employee who 
earns more than $30,000 in compensation from the State, or who 
3The Act also covers the judicial branch to the extent that 
it requires the Chief Judge, in consultation with the 
Administrative Board of the Courts, to approve a financial 
disclosure form for use by all judges, justices, and court 
officers and employees earning over $30,000. Ethics Act Section 
17 (N.Y. Jud. Law§ 211(4)). The Administrative Board has 
adopted the forms exactly as set forth in the Act. N.Y. Law 
Journal, March 18, 1988, at 1, col. 3. 
4The Act is described in greater detail in the Appendix. 
This Report and its Appendix do not attempt, however, to describe 
all the details, exceptions, and ambiguities contained in the Act 
and instead address the Act's general terms. 
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holds a policy-making position, and political party chairmen, to 
file an extensive annual financial disclosure statement, the 
forms for which are set forth in the Act. 
The Act is to be enforced by three separate agencies, 
one each for the legislative and executive branches and one for 
political subdivisions of the State (collectively, •ethics 
commissions•). These commissions may impose civil penalties for 
willful violations of certain provisions of the Act or may refer 
them for criminal prosecution. No such prosecution is permitted 
except upon referral by one of the agencies. •cure• provisions 
permit those who have filed deficient disclosure statements to 
correct them within fifteen days after notice of the deficien-
cies, and to correct other conduct proscribed by the Act. The 
Act also pre-empts the applicability of professional disciplinary 
rules with respect to certain conduct expressly permitted by the 
5 Act. 
5
certain provisions affect New York City, but the Act 
otherwise applies only at the state level and does not cover the 
State's political subdivisions, except that political 
subdivisions having a population of more than 50,000 must adopt 
their own financial disclosure forms by 1991, failing which the 
forms set forth in the Act will automatically apply. It is 
unclear on what basis political subdivisions of the State were 
entirely excluded from coverage by the broader substantive 
provisions of the Ethics Act. Small communities, no less than 
large ones, must grapple with conflicts of interest issues. This 
(Footnote Continued) 
* * * 
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While the Ethics Act makes important changes in our 
ethics laws, certain provisions and omissions remain deeply 
troubling. 6 The Act represents a significant step forward in the 
regulation of inappropriate conduct by New York State government 
officials. It is not a panacea for all the ills that currently 
plague government in New York State, but it provides momentum 
necessary for further improvements. 
(Footnote Continued) 
was made evident to the Commission when it undertook to gather 
citizens' views of local and state ethical issues throughout New 
York, and in investigations undertaken by the Commission. The 
Commission is convinced of the need for ethical guidelines 
applicable to all communities. Accordingly, the Commission is 
examining existing local codes of ethics and will shortly submit 
for public comment a preliminary draft ethics law for political 
subdivisions of the State. But see N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 801, 
802, 805-a, 806. 
6
see, ~, Memorandum from Robert Abrams, Attorney General 
of New York to Governor Cuomo at 6 (July 7, 1987) (wAbrams 
Memow). See also Letter from Craig E. Polhemus, Counsel to the 
New York State Office for the Aging to Evan Davis, Counsel to the 
Governor (August 6, 1987) (wPolhemus Letterw); Memorandum from 
Gilbert Harwood, Counsel to the Higher Education Services 
Corporation to Evan Davis (August 3, 1987) (wHigher Education 
Services Memow); Memorandum from Gails. Shaffer, New York State 
Secretary of State to Evan Davis (July 23, 1987) cwsecretary of 
State Memow); Memorandum from the New York State Bar Association 
to Governor Cuomo (July 23, 1987) (wNYSBA Memow); Memorandum from 
Gene Russianoff, New York Public Interest Research Group to Evan 
Davis (July 3, 1987) (wNYPIRG Memow) (all contained in the 
Governor's Bill Jacket for S.6441). This Report does not attempt 
to address all the issues raised in these memoranda. 
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Summary of Recommendations 
The New York State Commission on Government Integrity 
recommends amendments to the Act in order to strengthen its 
effect on the conduct of New York State government officials and 
employees that might interfere with their public responsibilities 
to the people of the State. Because ethical considerations are 
of equal concern to all branches of government, the Commission is 
of the view that uniformity of treatment of all branches, consis-
tent with their functions, best engenders public respect and 
integrity in government. The Commission therefore urges that the 
legislature give further consideration to the ways in which the 
Act applies disparately to the different branches. 7 In keeping 
7
see NYPIRG Memo, suora note 6. See also Letter of New York 
State Common Cause to Gov. Mario M. Cuomo (April 10, 1987) 
(contained in Governor's Bill Jacket on S.6441). For example, 
there is a two year post-employment ban on state officers' and 
employees' paid appearances before their own former agencies, as 
well as a lifetime bar on appearing or rendering services before 
any agency on matters in which they were •directly concerned and 
in which [they] personally participated• or which were under 
their •active consideration• during their government employment. 
Ethics Act Section 2.8 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(8)). In 
contrast, although former legislators are barred from compensated 
lobbying for two years after their government service, former 
legislative employees are barred, also from compensated lobbying, 
only for the remainder of the term in which they served, and even 
then only in regard to bills in which they were •directly 
concerned and in which [they] personally participated.• Id. 
Thus, legislative branch employees who leave on the last day of a 
term may commence private lobbying activities at the start of the 
(Footnote Continued) 
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with the Commission's mandate, however, the recommendations 
contained in this Report are limited in the case of legislators 
and legislative employees to the question of their appearances 
before state agencies and political subdivisions of the State. 
Based upon investigations, interviews and correspon-
dence with private individuals and public officials, and a 
comparative study of the laws and regulations of other jurisdic-
tions, the Commission recommends that: 
1. Covered individuals should be completely 
barred from making appearances, rendering services, and 
counselling on matters before state agencies for 
private clients, whether or not for compensation (pp. 
14-18); 
2. Covered individuals should be completely 
barred from making appearances, rendering services, and 
counselling on matters before political subdivisions of 
the State for private clients, whether or not for 
compensation (pp. 18-20); 
(Footnote Continued) 
next term, perhaps within days, even on matters in which they 
were directly and personally involved. 
3. Executive branch 
Report on the Ethics Act 
April 6, 1988 
Page 7 
officers and employees 
should be required to disqualify themselves from 
participating in official action that is likely to 
affect their particular personal financial interests in 
a manner different from those of the general public 
(pp. 20-22) ; 
4. The Act's referral mechanism for prosecution 
of violations should be repealed, and *cure* provisions 
should be expressly limited to allow correction only of 
unintentional violations of the Act (pp. 22-28); 
5. The Act's pre-emption of professional disci-
plinary codes and other regulations governing ethical 
conduct should be repealed (pp. 28-34); and 
6. The coverage of the financial disclosure 
provisions should be modified; the forms should be 
promulgated by the administering agencies; and exemp-
tion provisions should be modified (pp. 34-39). 
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Values Reflected in 
Conflicts of Interest Regulations 
In order to evaluate the Ethics Act, the Commission 
first considered the competing values and tensions that arise 
when private citizens hold public office. 
The evil ... [of conflicts of interest] is risk 
of impairment of impartial judgment, a risk 
which arises whenever there is temptation to 
serve personal interests. The quality of 
specific results is immaterial .... Like other 
fiduciaries, such as guardians, executors, 
lawyers, and agents, the public trustee has a 
duty to avoid private interests which cause 
even a risk that he will not be motivated 
solely by the interests of the beneficiaries 
of his trust. Properly conceived. conflict-
of-interest regulation does not condemn bad 
actions so much as it erects a system de-
signed to protect a decision-making process. 
It is preventive and prophylactic. Its aim 
is not detection and punishment of evil, but 
providing safeguard~ which lessen the risk of 
undesirable action. 
The oft-stated principle that •a public off ice is a 
public trust• suggests that those who act as public officers are 
8The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Special 
Committee on Congressional Ethics, Congress and the Public Trust 
39 (1970) (emphasis added). 
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fiduciaries. Conflicts of interest arise when government offi-
cials face an overlap of their public duties and their private 
interests: for example, when they or their business associates 
represent private clients, particularly before government agen-
cies, or when they have business interests that are regulated or 
otherwise affected by their decisions as officials of government. 
Although conflicts can also arise when public servants have 
personal or non-pecuniary interests at odds with their public 
duties, it would be impossible to control all these conflicts 
through legislation. 
Economic interests are more appropriately made subject 
to uniform regulation. Even then, inherent conflicts that arise 
when a government official is affected by government decisions 
which affect all other homeowners or taxpayers equally must 
obviously be tolerated. Government officials necessarily have 
private interests like all other citizens; this is an inevitable 
and beneficial fact of life. In the case of elected officials 
especially, it is often a candidate's personal experiences and 
interests that enable constituents to determine whether the 
candidate will be sensitive to their specific and legitimate 
needs and interests. 
Thus, however desirable it might seem to avoid all 
pecuniary conflicts of interest and the appearance of them, this 
Report on the Ethics Act 
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goal is nearly impossible to attain. Some federal, state, or 
local law touches nearly every aspect of our personal lives, 
particularly our business and financial transactions. Those who 
serve government on a part-time basis, or who have income or 
business interests outside of their government activity, or whose 
family members have such interests, are necessarily faced with 
all manner of real or potential conflicts. 9 
As public sensitivity to ethical standards of public 
servants has increased, there has been a tendency to assume that 
it is necessary to impose ever more stringent requirements 
prohibiting all conceivable conflicts. But the burdens on public 
servants must be taken into account, lest we discourage a signif-
icant number of honest, competent, and well-intentioned individ-
uals from participating in government. 
9
see Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 44. 
These issues generally arise to a much lesser extent for members 
of the judicial branch, where stringent conflict-of-interest 
rules already obtain. See, ~' Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Canons 3.C(l) (c), 5.C. In addition, the New York Judiciary Law 
provides that a judge shall be disqualified from taking part in 
the decision of any action or proceeding *in which he has been 
attorney or counsel, or in which he is interested.* N.Y. Jud. 
Law § 14. 
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In a study for the American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Research, Alfred S. Neely IV describes with intentional 
irony the conflict-free public servant: 
The ideal public servant should have no 
personal financial needs that the rewards he 
receives in return for his service cannot 
satisfy. There should be no need for part-
time jobs to supplement his public income. 
And he should have no financial interests 
that might present conflicts. His personal 
finances should be simple. What he brings to 
government or accumulates while there should 
be invested in nothing more flamboyant than 
U.S. savings bonds. 
Naturally the ideal public servant must 
come from somewhere, but it is preferable if 
he comes to the government directly after 
graduation from the educational system. He 
will then not carry with him any baggage of 
potential conflicts arising from prior 
employment and experience. Moreover, the 
ideal public servant should have no desire or 
opportunity to move out of government service 
for any reason other than retirement or 
death. 
. Thifi ideal obviously 
1st . ... 
does not ex-
Thus, Mr. Neely concludes: 
.•• [E]thics-in-government laws reflect 
one set of significant and worthwhile values. 
In great measure they serve to develop and 
protect public confidence in the integrity of 
government. It is important to note that 
present ethics-in-government laws do not 
attempt to achieve the highest conceivable 
standards. They are not unbending but reveal 
10A. Neely, Ethics-in-Government Laws: Are they Too 
6 Ethical 6 ? 53 (1984). 
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a degree of pragmatism and compromise in 
response to the exigencies as1~ell as the 
aspirations of good government. 
The Commission has thus grappled with the question: 
how can we best regulate the behavior of those who make and 
administer the law so as to protect the integrity of government 
without discouraging qualified citizens from participating in 
public service? 
There are four common methods used in conflicts of 
interest laws to avoid real or apparent conflicts: 
government officials may be prohibited from 
engaging in certain economic relationships; 
they may be required to disqualify themselves from 
participating in government action that might affect 
their interests; 
they may be required to disclose their financial 
interests, thus giving the public an opportunity to 
judge the propriety of their actions; 
they may be required to divest themselves of any 
interest which may cause a conflict. 
Each of these methods has been considered by the 
Commission in balancing the interests of the public and the 
llid. 
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private financial interests of government officials under New 
York's new Ethics Act. 
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Recommendations 
The Ethics Act should be amended as set forth below. 
These recommendations are intended to describe the objectives of 
proposed amendments to the Act; they are not phrased to suggest 
specific statutory language. 
1. covered individuals should be completely 
from making appearances, rendering services, 
counselling on matters before state agencies 
private clients, whether or not for compensation. 
barred 
and 
for 
The Ethics Act bars appearances and the rendition of 
services for compensation relating to any matter before a state 
agency involving six broad areas: (i) the purchase, sale, rental, 
or lease of real property, goods or services, or a contract 
therefor, involving any such agency; (ii) rate-making proceed-
ings; (iii) the adoption or repeal of rules or regulations having 
the force of law; (iv) obtaining grants of money or loans; (v) 
licensing; and (vi) proceedings relating to certain franchises. 
The Act thus prohibits covered individuals and political party 
chairmen from appearing before most state agencies for most 
purposes. 12 
12
see Ethics Act Section 2.7(a) (i-vi) (N.Y. Pub . Off. Law§ 
73(7)(a)). 
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Some proceedings, however, including certain adminis-
trative and criminal investigatory matters, are not covered by 
the Act. For example, the Act would permit a covered individual 
to represent a taxpayer in challenging administrative determi-
nations concerning tax deficiencies. These challenges may be 
made before the Bureau of Conciliation and Mediation, and the 
Division of Tax Appeals, of the Department of Taxation and Fi-
nance. 
Government employees' representation of private parties 
before public agencies inevitably creates an appearance of 
impropriety and the risk that even the best-intentioned actions 
by the agencies will be impaired by the presence of undue pres-
sures. These appearances may compromise the impartiality of the 
government employees' decision-making because their official 
decisions could affect their clients', and hence their own, 
personal interests. Many government employees also exercise 
significant control over the budgets and operations of adminis-
trative and regulatory agencies. Their appearances before those 
agencies can lead to abuses of power, including coerced or biased 
decision-making by the agency in favor of the government employ-
ees' clients, or possible retaliation by government employees 
Report on the Ethics Act 
April 6, 1988 
Page 16 
. h f f bl d . . 13 against t e agency or un avora e ec1s1ons. An agency 
official before whom government employees appear may respond to 
perceived wundue influencew even when none is intended. 
Thus, while it is commendable that the Ethics Act 
restricts covered individuals' compensated appearances and 
rendition of services on matters before state agencies, public 
confidence in government integrity would be enhanced and better 
served by a total prohibition on all appearances on behalf of 
private clients that might raise even the spectre of undue 
influence. Indeed, heads of certain agencies have publicly urged 
that all appearances before their agencies, including some that 
are not now covered by the Act, be prohibited. 14 The Commission 
recommends that all appearances and rendition of services for 
whatever purposes before state agencies by covered individuals on 
behalf of private clients be barred. 
13
see Reeves, Leaislators As Private Attorneys: The Need 
For Legislative Reform, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1052, 1056-59 (1983). 
14
see Abrams Memo, supra note 6 at pages 1-2; Letter of 
Roderick G.W. Chu, Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, 
President, State of New York Tax Commission, to the Honorable 
Mario M. Cuomo (July 17, 1987) (wTax Memow) pp. 1-2. At least as 
early as 1964, the Legislature's Special Committee on Ethics 
recommended wthat members of the Legislature and legislative 
employees be prohibited from practicing or appearing before most 
state agencies for compensation.w Report of the Special 
Committee on Ethics (March 1964) at page 4. 
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Nor does the Act prohibit uncompensated representation 
of private clients before state agencies in most circumstances. 
The Act should be amended to prohibit this practice by covered 
individuals. The appearance of undue influence and the possibili-
ty of undue pressure on state agencies, even if unintended, is no 
less present because a government employee is not accepting 
t . 15 compensa ion. 
In addition, the Act now expressly permits unpaid 
internal research and discussion on matters before state agen-
cies. Such unpaid counselling for private clients should be 
barred. The legislature has taken only the first step to dis-
tance covered individuals from inappropriate contacts by prohib-
iting certain personal appearances. Prohibiting private counsel-
ling would erect a complete barrier between the duties of a 
public servant and the interests of private clients who have 
matters pending before state agencies. Allowing private counsel-
ling on matters before state agencies creates the impression that 
a client is still getting special benefits by virtue of contact 
with a covered individual. This is especially so if the covered 
15Nothing in the Act prohibits -- or should prohibit -- a 
legislator (or legislative employee acting on his or her behalf) 
from advocating any position in any matter in the legislator's 
official capacity, whether or not on behalf of a constituent. 
Ethics Act Section 2.7(d) (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(7) (d)). 
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individual's law partner or business associate makes the actual 
appearance before the state agency on behalf of the client. 
A total bar, including a bar on unpaid appearances, 
rendition of services, and counselling on matters before state 
agencies for private clients would help set to rest any suspicion 
that a covered individual's client enjoys an unfair advantage 
over other members of the public. 
2. Covered 
from makinq 
counsellinq 
of the state 
compensation. 
individuals should be completely barred 
appearances, renderinq services, and 
on matters before political subdivisions 
for private clients, whether or not for 
The Ethics Act prohibits certain appearances by covered 
individuals before state agencies, but does not prohibit their 
appearances before political subdivisions of the State. There 
should be no such distinction. The same reasoning supporting 
restrictions on appearances before state agencies compels similar 
restrictions on appearances before all political subdivisions of 
the State. Covered individuals ought not to appear before local 
governments on behalf of private clients when the decisions of 
the covered individuals inevitably affect those governments. 16 
16Mayor Koch supports such a bar and has stated that the 
Ethics Act prohibition •should be broadened to bar state officers 
{Footnote Continued) 
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Commission interviews with a number of current and 
former local officials have confirmed the view that, at the very 
least, an wappearancew problem exists whenever a state official 
contacts local government agencies on behalf of private clients. 
Regardless of the ultimate outcome, there is always the possibil-
ity of inappropriate pressure on a local official. One 
interviewee pointed out that New York City and its agencies rely 
heavily on appropriations from Albany, and that New York City 
whas a big casew pending before the Albany legislature every 
year. Thus, a legislator's request to a local agency on behalf 
of a private client should be considered as impermissible as a 
judge's request for a favor from a lawyer who has a case pending 
before the judge. 17 
Officials in smaller political subdivisions face equal, 
if not greater, pressure to please one who might have influence 
at the state level to benefit their localities. The Commission 
believes, therefore, that the prohibition against appearances 
(Footnote Continued) 
and employees from appearing before local government agencies, 
where they may also exercise or appear to exercise undue 
influence.w Letter, Mayor Edward I. Koch to Governor Mario M. 
Cuomo (April 15, 1987). 
17
canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits a 
variety of extra-judicial activities, including judges' business 
transactions with persons likely to come before them, in order to 
minimize the risk of conflict with their official duties. 
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should extend to those by covered individuals before all politi-
cal subdivisions of the State and their agencies, not just before 
agencies of the State itself. 
3. Executive branch officers and employees should be 
required to disqualify themselves from participating in 
official action that is likely to affect their personal 
financial interests in a manner different from those of 
the general public. 
The Ethics Act does not require disqualification of a 
government employee in the event that the employee's official 
duties conflict with personal financial interests. 18 
18
section 74 of the Public Officers Law, a precatory 
provision that contains New York's •code of Ethics,• does suggest 
that government employees should not engage in transactions as 
representatives of the State with businesses in which they have 
financial interests, and that they should abstain from making 
personal investments when they have reason to believe that those 
investments might be directly involved in decisions to be made by 
them. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§ 74(3) (e), (g). This is consistent 
with the notion that state officials and employees and 
legislators and legislative employees should regard their 
personal financial interests as subordinate to their 
responsibility to uphold the public trust. They should be 
sensitive to the possibility that any given business transaction 
might be viewed as creating a potential conflict, and only if it 
is unlikely to do so should they enter into the transaction. 
Ethical Consideration 8-8 of the Lawyer's Code of 
Professional Responsibility similarly discourages attorneys 
holding public office from entering into transactions that 
•foreseeably may• create a conflict with the proper discharge of 
their public duties. 
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The clearest conflicts of interest arise when govern-
ment officials, or their families or business associates, have 
interests in private entities that do business with, are regulat-
ed by, or are otherwise directly affected financially by actions 
of the agencies they work with. There are also less obvious 
economic relationships which may impair a public servant's 
ability to perform an official duty impartially. For example, a 
public official who receives an outside salary from, accepts 
gifts or honoraria from, holds investments in, owes a debt to, or 
is a director or officer in an entity affected by government 
action may face a conflict. 
A government employee should not take official action 
that might be influenced by personal financial interests, and one 
who does should be subject to sanctions. Disqualification in 
cases of such conflict should be mandatory to protect the public 
from biased decision-making. Such prohibitions exist in other 
states, 19 as well as at the federal leve1. 20 
19s .. 
ee, ~' Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 84-14(a) {1985); La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 42:1112{C) (West 1965); Md. Ann. Code art. 40A, § 
3-lOl(a) {1986); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4:1700(72) (7) (Callaghan 
1985) (Mich. Comp. Laws§ 15.342(7)). 
2018 u.s.c. § 208 (1987). Under this statute, a government 
official who does not give notice of a personal conflict and 
obtain prior written approval for continued participation in a 
{Footnote Continued) 
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New York should accordingly require disqualification of 
government employees from taking official action on matters in 
which they have personal financial interests different from those 
of the general public. 
4. The Act's referral mechanism for prosecution of 
violations should be repealed, and *cure* provisions 
should be expressly limited to allow correction only of 
unintentional violations of the Act. 
There are serious deficiencies in the Act's enforce-
ment provisions which require reappraisal and improvement. 
(a) The Referral Mechanism for 
Criminal Penalties Should be Repealed. 
If an individual knowingly and intentionally (or 
willfully) violates the conflict of interest or financial disclo-
sure provisions of the Ethics Act, the ethics commission with 
jurisdiction over the offender can assess a civil penalty of up 
to ten thousand dollars. 21 
(Footnote Continued) 
matter may be fined, imprisoned, or both. See United States v. 
Irons, 640 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1981). 
21 th' E 1CS Act §§ 2.6, 2.14, 3.4 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§ 
73(6),(14), 73-a(4)). 
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The Act further provides, however, that the commissions 
may, in lieu of the civil penalty, refer a violation wto the 
appropriate prosecutor and upon ... conviction, but only after 
such referral, such violation shall be punishable as a class A 
. d #22 mis emeanor. Thus, if there is no administrative referral, 
there can be no criminal prosecution--even if the violation 
constitutes a crime, and even if facts supporting prosecution are 
uncovered by a separate and independent investigation. 
The Commission is aware of no other state that condi-
tions prosecution for violation of its ethics laws upon referral 
f d . . t t. 23 o an a minis ra ive agency. In addition, the mutual exclusiv-
ity of remedies places the ethics commissions in the anomolous 
position of choosing between a certain, but possibly inadequate, 
civil sanction and an uncertain, but possibly more appropriate, 
criminal prosecution. 
22
rd. (emphasis added). 
23 For example, sanctions of fine and/or imprisonment 
provided in the Maryland Public Ethics Law are not contingent 
upon commission action. Md. Ann. Code art. 40A §7-102 (1986). 
Virginia specifically provides that violations of its Ethics Law 
6 may be prosecuted notwithstanding the jurisdiction of, or any 
pending proceeding before, the House or Senate Ethics Advisory 
Panel. 6 Va. Code § 2.1-639.61 (1987) 
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By providing that a violation of the Ethics Act may be 
prosecuted as a misdemeanor only after commission referral to a 
prosecutor, the Act substantially dilutes the purpose of indepen-
dent prosecutorial agencies. 24 Further, violations of some of 
the provisions of Section 73 of the Public Officers Law that are 
affected by the new referral mechanisms were already punishable 
as misdemeanors under prior law, and without a referral of any 
kind. 25 This effective withdrawal of independent discretion to 
24
see Letter from Robert M. Morgenthau on behalf of the 
District Attorneys Association of New York to Gov. Mario M. Cuomo 
(July 15, 1987) (wD.A.'s Letterw); Abrams Memo, supra note 6, at 
pages 2-3; Higher Education Services Memo, supra note 6, at page 
2; Polhemus Letter, supra note 6, at page 1; NYSBA Memo, supra 
note 6, at page 2. 
25 N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(10) (old law). The prior law and 
the new law have many similar prohibitions. Compare N.Y. Pub. 
Off. Law§ 73(2)-(5), (7) (old law) with Ethics Act Section 2 
(N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73). In both laws, subdivision (2) 
prohibits a state officer or employee from receiving a contingent 
fee for an appearance before a state agency; subdivision (3) 
prohibits state officers from appearing against the State for 
compensation in the Court of Claims; subdivision (4) prohibits a 
political party chairman or a state official from selling goods 
to the State or contracting with the State unless the contract is 
awarded after notice and competitive bidding; and subdivision (5) 
prohibits a state officer from accepting anything of value which 
may influence that officer's actions. Subdivision (7) of the 
prior law, retained and renumbered as subdivision (8) in the new 
law, prohibits a state officer from appearing before the agency 
with which that officer was associated for two years after 
leaving office. Knowing and intentional violations of any of 
these provisions was a misdemeanor under the prior law. N.Y. 
Pub. Off. Law§ 73 (10) (old law); see also Abrams Memo, supra, 
note 6, at page 4; People v. Zambuto, 73 A.D.2d 828, 423 N.Y.S.2d 
770 (4th Dep't 1979). In addition, N.Y. Penal Law§§ 200.30 & 
(Footnote Continued) 
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prosecute violations of the Ethics Act may well be unconstitu-
t . 1 26 iona . 
Whether or not it is unconstitutional, the referral 
mechanism sends a wholly inappropriate message to the citizens of 
this State. It feeds every citizen's worst fear: that public 
(Footnote Continued) 
200.35 prohibit gifts to public officials for the performance of 
official duties. N.Y. Penal Law§ 175.45 provides that a person 
issuing a false financial statement with intent to defraud is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. N.Y. Penal Law § 173.35 
provides that a person #offering a false instrument for f ilingw 
with intent to defraud the State is guilty of a Class E felony. 
26The New York Constitution provides: 
The power of the grand juries to inquire 
into the wilful misconduct in off ice of 
public officers, and to find indict-
ments or to direct the filing of 
informations in connection with such 
inquiries, shall never be suspended or 
impaired by law. 
N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. Administrative referral as a condition 
precedent to a district attorney's prosecution may violate these 
provisions. See, ~' D.A.'s Letter, supra note 24; Letter from 
Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney of Kings County, to 
Governor Mario M. Cuomo (July 24, 1987); see also Abrams Memo, 
supra note 6; NYPIRG Memo, supra note 6. 
By contrast, Senator Warren M. Anderson, a sponsor of the 
Ethics Act, defends the constitutionality of the referral 
mechanism as •well within [the legislature's) power to define or 
redefine the misdemeanor violations•. Letter of Warren M. 
Anderson to John D. Feerick (December 7, 1987) (•Anderson 
Letter•) at page 3. Moreover, if the referral provision were to 
be found unenforceable, Senator Anderson concludes that •the 
entire misdemeanor provisions should be unenforceable unless and 
until the Legislature enacts a new law to replace them.w Id. 
Report on the Ethics Act 
April 6, 1988 
Page 26 
officials have something to hide and intend to hide it. As 
Justice Brandeis stated: 
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher. 
For good29r for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example. 
The government should not teach that private citizens 
are subject to the inquiries of an independent prosecutor, while 
those who hold government office are not. 
(b) The Act's cure Provisions Should be Clarified to 
Apply Only to Unintentional Violations. 
The Ethics Act provides a 15-day period during which a 
covered individual who is in possible violation of the Act may 
cure any *deficiency• in a financial disclosure form. If the 
deficiency is cured, no action is taken, and the deficiency is 
never publicly disclosed. The Act also seems to provide an 
undefined opportunity for •any potential conflict of interest 
violation• to be •rectified•. 28 It is unclear whether these cure 
provisions pre-empt criminal or civil sanction in the event that 
the violations are intentional. 
27
olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
28Ethics Act Sections 7.11 & 12, 9.10 & 11, 16.11 & 12 (N.Y. 
Exec. Law§§ 94(11) & (12), N.Y. Legis. Law§§ 80(10) & (11), 
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§§ 813(11) & (12)). 
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In testimony before the Commission, Governor Cuomo and 
his Counsel expressed the view that the 15-day cure provision 
pre-empts further action only in cases involving inadvertent or 
innocent infractions, not willful violations, of the Act. 29 Yet, 
another plausible reading of this section as enacted is that a 
cure pre-empts any further action in all cases, or that a willful 
violation is, by definition, only one that the violator refuses 
to cure. New York County District Attorney Morgenthau, writing on 
behalf of the District Attorneys Association of New York, inter-
prets the Ethics Act to permit a complete cure in every case, and 
objects to it on that ground: wNo other law permits a violator 
such an opportunity to undo his crime with full confidentiality. 
The result is that serious misconduct will go unpunished.w 30 
Clearly, one who has been guilty of a wwillful viola-
tion" ought not to be given any grace period to cure the unlawful 
behavior after notice from an oversight agency. The Commission 
29
see transcript of proceedings before the Commission on 
September 9, 1987, at pages 5-6. See also Anderson Letter, supra 
note 26 (to like effect). 
30 D.A.'s Letter, supra note 24, at page 2. The 
administrative procedures for notice and opportunity to cure are 
confidential under the Ethics Act, so that the public cannot 
monitor the proceedings. Ethics Act Sections 7.12(a), 9.ll(a), 
16.12(a) (N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(12) (a), N.Y. Legis. Law§ 
80(1l)(a), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813(12)(a)). 
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recommends that the Ethics Act be amended to provide explicitly 
that procedures and penalties for willful violations of the 
Ethics Act are not pre-empted by the cure provisions. 
s. The Act's pre-emption of professional disciplinary 
codes and other requlations governing ethical 
conduct should be repealed. 
The Ethics Act pre-empts the application of profession-
al disciplinary rules under certain circumstances. 31 It provides 
that former legislators and legislative employees are not subject 
to wany provision of the judiciary law, the education law, or any 
other law or disciplinary rule 6 in regard to conduct authorized 
by the revolving door provisions of the Act. 
The same exemption from professional disciplinary rules 
applies to appearances and the rendition of services before state 
agencies by members of firms, associations, and corporations that 
are affiliated with present or former covered individuals (and 
political party chairmen), as long as these individuals receive 
no revenues from these matters. 
31Ethics Act Section 2.ll(a) & (c) (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 
73 (11) (a) & (c)). 
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This provision of the Act effectively insulates those 
who fall within its purview from the reach of existing and future 
ethical codes of professional conduct to which they would other-
wise be answerable. Affected groups include attorneys, real 
estate brokers, accountants, engineers, architects, and health 
professionals. 
With respect to attorneys, the pre-emption provision 
withdraws from the New York State courts the power to discipline 
lawyers for conduct proscribed by the Lawyer's Code of Profes-
. 1 'b ' l't 32 It . . t t t t th t th Cd siona Responsi 1 1 y. is impor an o no e a e o e 
makes no distinction between attorneys in and out of government. 
Indeed, the American Bar Association considered and rejected a 
32The Code, which governs the ethical conduct of members of 
the bar of the State of New York, appears as an Appendix to the 
New York Judiciary Law and has been incorporated by reference by 
each Appellate Division in the State in its respective rule 
defining professional misconduct. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 603.2, 691.2, 
806.2, 1022.17. 
A substantial violation of the Code may constitute grounds 
for censure, suspension, or removal of an attorney from the 
practice of law in New York, pursuant to N.Y. Jud. Law§ 90(2). 
See In Re Connelly, 18 A.D.2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1st Dep't 
1963). The Judiciary Law, in turn, acknowledges that an 
attorney's professional conduct is uniquely regulated by the 
courts, of which the attorney is an officer. In Re Cohen, 7 
N.Y.2d 488, 166 N.E.2d 672, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1960), aff'd, 366 
U.S. 117 (1961). 
The pre-emption provision of the Act has been severely 
criticized by the New York State Bar Association. See NYSBA 
Memo, supra note 6, at pages 4, 6-7. 
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proposal of the National Association of Attorneys General that 
the conflict-of-interest sections of the Code's proposed succes-
sor, the Model Rules, be made inapplicable to lawyers in govern-
t . 33 men service. 
Among the principles espoused in the Code potentially 
implicated by the Act are the following: 
33 
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a 
matter in which the lawyer had substantial3iesponsibil-ity while he or she was a public employee. 
A lawyer who holds public off ice shall not use his 
or her public position to influence, or 3gttempt to influence, a tribunal in favor of a client. 
A lawyer who is a public official should not 
engage in personal or professional activitijg that may 
conflict with the lawyer's official duties. 
A lawyer shall not accept professional employment 
if the exercise of his or her professional judgment on 
behalf of a client may be affected by the lawyer's 39wn financial, business, property or personal interest. 
See Josephson & Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer 
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L. 
J. 539, 557 n.86 (1986). 
34 DR 9-lOl(B). 
35DR 8-lOl(A) (2). 
36EC 8-8. 
37DR 5-lOl(A). 
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If a lawyer must decline employment on the grounds 
that representation of one client may impair the 
lawyer's judgment with respect to another, then no 
partner or associate of the lawyer, or of the38lawyer's firm, may accept or continue such employment. 
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for legal 
services from someone other t~~n his or her client, 
except by the client's consent. 
To the Commission's knowledge, this is the first time 
that the legislature in its 200-year history has expressly 
superseded the disciplinary power of the courts, and the occasion 
for the departure is particularly ill-chosen. Withdrawing 
oversight authority from an independent court system while 
claiming to enhance government ethics can only engender public 
skepticism. Indeed, as with the prosecutorial referral mechanism 
described above, the Commission is aware of no other state which 
effectively exempts covered individuals from compliance with 
existing laws and disciplinary codes. The Commission strongly 
disapproves the withdrawal of the authority of professional 
organizations to impose standards of conduct upon their members 
that may be more stringent than those deemed desirable by the 
legislature. 
38DR 5-105(0). 
39DR 5-107(A) (1). 
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With respect to the underlying question whether firms 
should be vicariously disqualified by the Act itself, the Commis-
sion is persuaded that the Act's prohibitions on appearances 
before state agencies, coupled with the broadening of these bars 
as specified in the Commission's Recommendation 1, 40 will reduce 
both the reality and the appearance of conflicts . The Commission 
further recommends, however, that the Act's approach to limita-
tions on appearances stand only on an experimental basis and that 
the legislature revisit this issue within one year after the 
effective date of the Act. 41 At that time, the legislature 
40
see supra pp. pages 14-18. 
41 
' ' ' h d D E d ' t d th Commissioner Ric ar . mery issen s an expresses e 
following views: The prohibition on covered individuals 
appearing before state or municipal agencies should apply to 
their law or business associates as well. The impropriety, or 
appearance of impropriety, which occurs when a public official or 
employee appears before a state or local agency on behalf of a 
private client is no less when the partner of the public official 
or employee does so. Traditionally, attorneys have been barred 
by ethics codes from serving two masters and, when they are 
barred, their partners have been as well. The duty of a 
legislator to constituents is at least as compelling as that of a 
lawyer to a client, and the two should never be allowed to 
conflict. When partners of legislators represent clients before 
state or municipal agencies, the legislator's duty to 
constituents is compromised. 
While such a rule might require legislators or their staff 
members not to join, or to resign from, large law or other 
professional firms, that would be an acceptable price to pay to 
avoid the chilling effect on government decision-makers when 
powerful legislators' partners are seeking to influence their 
decisions. Twenty-five percent of the members of both houses of 
the legislature combined are attorneys. 
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should determine, in light of the new prohibitions and disclo-
sures made under the Act, 42 whether the prohibitions on appear-
ances before state agencies should be extended to firms, associa-
tions, and corporations affiliated with covered individuals. 43 
It may be, for example, that the presence of a legislator's name 
on the letterhead of the firm is alone sufficient to create an 
appearance of conflict or cause the citizenry to doubt the 
even-handed administration of government. In that case, the 
legislature should not hesitate to impose requirements more 
stringent than those contained in professional rules; but in any 
event the legislature should not interfere, as it has in the 
42Ethics Act Section 8 (N.Y. Exec. Law§ 166) provides that 
state regulatory agencies must keep public records of attorneys, 
agents, and representatives who appear before them #for ... a 
feew. The Commission recommends that this section be amended to 
require records of uncompensated, as well as compensated, 
appearances (see supra Recommendation 1). that this information 
be maintained in a useful form, and that it be given appropriate 
public dissemination. 
43Establishment of a full-time legislature would be one way 
in which to avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of 
them, particularly those conflicts resulting from the dealings of 
legislators' law partners and business associates with state 
agencies. The Commission, however, takes no position on such a 
major change in New York State government. The Commission 
understands that this issue has been committed to the wpay 
Commission# recently appointed by Governor Cuomo. 
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pre-emption provision of the Act, with minimum ethical standards 
imposed by professional organizations on their members. 44 
6. The coverage of the financial disclosure provi-
sions should be modified; the forms should be promul-
gated by the administering agencies; and exemption 
provisions should be modified. 
The Commission endorses the principle of broad f inan-
. 1 d' 1 45 cia isc osure. The disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act 
44For the current standards applicable to vicarious 
disqualification of firms associated with government officials, 
see,~., Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility DR 
5-105(D); New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 415 
(1975); New York State Bar Association, Draft of the Lawyer's 
Code of Professional Responsibility (October 5, 1987) at 68, 112. 
45
commissioners James L. Magavern and Richard D. Emery 
support a different approach to disclosure, which they believe 
would prove both less intrusive upon the personal lives of state 
employees and more effective in protecting the public interest. 
In their view, the annual statement specified by the current 
Ethics Act requires disclosure of considerable information that 
will only rarely be relevant to anything the employee will ever 
do in his or her state position. The form and scope of 
disclosure are intimidating and may discourage people in and from 
public service. Review of the form by the ethics commissions 
will hardly be more than perfunctory. At the same time, the form 
specified by the Act does not require information as to somewhat 
more remote interests and relationships that might influence the 
employee in his or her official acts. For example, a government 
inspector's interest in approving conditions at a relative's 
employer's establishment will not be revealed in any disclosure 
statement. They believe that, instead of annual, uniform 
disclosure for all covered employees, regardless of relevance to 
their particular jobs, the Act should require disclosure on a 
transactional basis. Before taking action in a particular matter 
in which the employee (or a party related to the employee by 
family or business) has an interest, the employee should be 
(Footnote Continued) 
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46 
are among the most important in the entire law. The Commission 
nonetheless recommends changes in the law to improve its effec-
tiveness. 
The Act provides that all government employees who earn 
more than $30,000 from their government employment must file a 
disclosure form unless they can show, to the satisfaction of the 
appropriate commission, that they do not occupy a policy-making 
position and do not perform certain functions specified in the 
Act. 47 
(Footnote Continued) 
required to file a transactional disclosure statement identifying 
that interest and relationship in reasonable detail. Information 
thus disclosed would be more relevant to a particular transaction 
than any annual disclosure. It would be more difficult for the 
employee to withhold or obfuscate relevant information. And, by 
focussing on a particular transaction, disclosure would serve to 
alert the employee, his or her associates, other parties, and the 
public to potential conflicts of interest. Commissioner Magavern 
is also of the view that, particularly in the case of the 
Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics, the review 
procedures for annual disclosure statements will be unworkable 
and offensive to notions of Home Rule. 
46Ethics Act Sections 3 & 14 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 73-a, 
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 811). 
47Ethics Act Sections 3.2(a), 7.9(k), 9.8(d). (N.Y. Pub. 
Off. Law§ 73-a(2) (a); N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(k)). See also Ethics 
Act Section 9.8(d) (N.Y. Legis. Law§ 80(8) (d)). Many other 
individuals are also required to file statements. 
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The Act thus presumes that all employees earning over 
$30,000 occupy positions of authority sufficient to warrant the 
imposition of financial disclosure requirements. It is estimated 
that over 65,000 government employees may be required to file 
forms under this provision. 48 The consequence will very likely 
be an almost insurmountable burden of paperwork, resulting in 
inadequate enforcement of the disclosure requirements, and 
disrespect for the Act's requirements among many employees now 
covered for no apparent purpose. 
The Commission recommends that, as in other states, 
financial disclosure requirements be keyed to particular policy-
making offices, rather than to salary levels. 49 In this way, 
disclosure is assured from those persons actually making policy 
decisions, and neither the ethics commission charged with 
48Memorandum of Division of the Budget, July 29, 1987, 
Paragraph 5. The scope of coverage is criticized in Higher 
Education Services Memo, supra note 6; Tax Memo, supra note 14, 
at page 2; Polhemus Letter, supra note 6; Letter of Donald E. 
Urell, Counsel, New York State Executive Department Division for 
Youth to Evan A. Davis (July 13, 1987); Letter of Howard A. 
Fromer, Counsel, New York State Energy Office (July 16, 1987); 
Letter of Raymond c. Green, General Attorney, State Insurance 
Fund to Evan A. Davis (July 10, 1987); Memorandum of Jeffrey 
Chamberlain, Counsel, New York State Police to Evan A. Davis 
(August 3, 1987). 
49 See,~., Hawaii Rev. Stat. §84-17 (1985); Mass. Ann. 
Laws ch. 268B, §§ 1 & 3 (1987). 
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reviewing the disclosure forms nor the state employees obligated 
to submit them will be unnecessarily burdened. The appropriate 
commission, in consultation with each agency, is best equipped to 
promulgate a list of those off ices for which disclosure forms 
should be provided. 
The Commission also believes that the inclusion of 
actual financial disclosure forms in the text of the law is 
ill-advised. 50 It creates an unnecessary obstacle to improve-
ment of the forms, since modification will require legislative, 
rather than administrative, approval. The Commission urges that 
the law be amended to provide minimum disclosure requirements, 
but to allow the appropriate commission to generate the specific 
forms, in order to facilitate amendment in light of experience. 
Finally, the Act contains two exemption provisions, 
both of which should be modified. First, the Act allows covered 
individuals to omit financial information from their disclosure 
forms, or to have deleted certain information for purposes of 
public dissemination, if the covered individuals can demonstrate 
that the information has •no material bearing• on their official 
50Ethics Act Sections 3.3, 15.5 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 
73-a(3), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 812(5)). 
d t . 51 u 1es. 
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Second, the Act provides that actual values of finan-
cial interests are not publicly disclosed under any circumstanc-
52 
es. 
The Commission questions the appropriateness of these 
exemptions. A vague policy permitting individual exceptions to 
an otherwise uniform requirement undermines public confidence and 
invites suspicion that the standard for what has a •material 
bearing• on official duties will not be interpreted 
even-handedly. The commissions should have the power to suspend 
or modify a reporting requirement only if they find (a) that its 
strict application works a manifestly unreasonable hardship and 
(b) that such suspension or modification will not frustrate the 
purposes of the law. 
The exemption from public disclosure of the values of 
financial interests is inappropriate and should be repealed. As 
a general proposition, the greater the role of secrecy in the 
business dealings of government officials, the less confidence 
51Ethics Act Sections 7.9(h-i), 9.8(h-i), 16.9(h-i) (N.Y. 
Exec. Law§ 94(9) (h-i), N.Y . Legis. Law§ 80(8) (h-i), N.Y. Gen. 
Mun. Law§ 813(9) (h-i). 
52Ethics Act Sections 7.17(a) (1), 9.16(a) (1), 16.18(a) (1) 
(N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(17) (a) (1), N.Y. Legis. Law§ 80(16) (a) (1), 
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813(18) (a) (1)). 
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government itself can expect to inspire. Publicly reporting the 
values of financial interests held by covered individuals is, in 
large part, the purpose of the financial disclosure requirement 
-- it facilitates public scrutiny of business interests at odds 
with the impartial execution of public duties. 
Conclusion 
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Law, like the society it reflects, is constantly 
changing. It is informed by the ideals of the people who create 
it and it, in turn, influences their behavior. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in laws regulating ethics in government. It is 
by enacting rules for government officials that the public 
articulates acceptable standards of conduct and helps to deter-
mine the integrity of its government. 
The Ethics in Government Act is an important beginning. 
The public has demanded higher standards from its government 
officials and employees, and the government has begun to respond. 
Some conduct previously countenanced by law has now been deemed 
unacceptable. 
The process, however, is not complete -- nor should it 
ever be. No body of law which seeks to regulate the complexities 
of conflicts in government service will ever achieve perfection. 
Nonetheless, the law should always strive to demand that those 
who hold the public trust remain worthy of it. The Commission 
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believes that the changes urged in its recommendations are 
essential to this endeavor. 
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Appendix 
Summary of the Ethics Act 
The Ethics Act1 includes the following provisions: 
1. Appearances Before State Agencies 
The Act prohibits statewide elected officials, state 
officers and employees, and legislators and legislative employees 
(collectively, "covered individuals*), as well as political party 
chairmen (but not their law firms or business associates), from 
making appearances or rendering services for compensation relat-
ing to matters before a state agency on behalf of private clients 
in relation to: (i) the purchase, sale, rental, or lease of real 
property, goods or services, or a contract therefor, involving 
any such agency; (ii) rate-making proceedings; (iii) the adoption 
or repeal of rules or regulations having the force of law; (iv) 
obtaining grants of money or loans; (v) licensing; and (vi) 
certain franchise proceedings2• Some proceedings, including 
1Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404 
(S.6441, A.8528). The Ethics Act will be codified in various 
sections of New York's Public Officers Law, Executive Law, 
Legislative Law, Judiciary Law, and General Municipal Law. 
2In this Report and Appendix, as in the Act, •statewide 
elected officials* refers to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Comptroller, and Attorney General. *State officers and 
employees" refers to heads, deputies, assistants, officers, and 
employees of state departments; officers and employees of 
statewide elected officials; officers and employees of state 
boards, bureaus, divisions, commissions, and councils; and 
members, directors, and employees of public authorities, public 
(Footnote Continued) 
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certain administrative and criminal investigatory proceedings by 
state agencies, are not covered by these prohibitions. 
The Ethics Act, like previous law, prohibits covered 
individuals (but not political party chairmen) from receiving 
contingent compensation for any services rendered before a state 
agency, whether or not those services fall within the six catego-
ries described above. Prohibitions on compensated appearances 
against the interests of the state in the Court of Claims are 
also continued. There is no prohibition against uncompensated 
appearances before state agencies or the Court of Claims, except 
for post-employment appearances by state officers and employees 
before their former agencies, which are entirely barred for a 
period of two years after termination of government service. The 
Act specifically authorizes internal discussion and research by 
covered individuals for private clients on matters pending 
before state agencies, as long as the clients are . not charged for 
that discussion and research and the covered individuals do not 
share in the net revenue produced by those matters. 
(Footnote Continued) 
benefit corporations, and commissions at least one of whose 
members is appointed by the Governor. •Political party chairmen" 
includes, for most purposes, individuals performing the functions 
or exercising the powers of such chairmen. Ethics Act Section 
2.1 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(1)). State agencies are defined to 
include any of the state departments, the State University of New 
York, and the City University of New York, as well as public 
benefit corporations, public authorities, and commissions at 
least one of whose members is appointed by the Governor. Ethics 
Act Section 2.l(g) (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(1) (g)). 
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Firms, associations, or corporations connected with 
present or former covered individuals (and political party 
chairmen) may appear before, render services to, and transact 
business with a state agency, provided that the covered individu-
al does not share in the net revenues or •acting in good faith, 
reasonably believed that he or she would not share in the net 
revenues.• A similar provision applies to appearances and 
transactions by firms of covered individuals before the Court of 
Claims. 
The Act also contains other exceptions allowing appear-
ances before state agencies. Appearances involving ministerial 
matters are expressly permitted. Covered individuals may of 
course act on any matter in their official capacity, and legisla-
tors and legislative employees, specifically, may act as •public 
advocate[s] whether or not on behalf of a constituent.• Individ-
uals already appearing or rendering services in a particular 
matter as of January 1, 1988, are not prohibited from continuing 
to do so after that date if substitution of counsel would impose 
a substantial hardship on the client. 3 
3Ethics Act Sections 2.2; 2.7(a), (c), (d), & (g); 2.10; 18 
(N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§ 73(2), (7) (a), (c), (d), & (g), (10)). 
. Pg. A-4 
2. Revolving Door Provisions 
The Ethics Act limits former state officers and employ-
ees with respect to rendering services on behalf of private 
clients before their former state agencies. It prohibits such 
appearances, whether or not for compensation, for a period of two 
years dating from separation from government service. It forever 
prohibits appearances relating to matters with which the officers 
and employees were directly concerned and personally involved. 
Former legislators are prohibited from receiving compensation for 
lobbying on any matter for two years after they leave the legis-
lature. There is no bar on former legislators for uncompensated 
lobbying, however, and no lifetime bar. Prohibitions are also 
placed on compensated lobbying by former legislative employees, 
but only for the balance of the legislative term in which they 
were employed, and then only with respect to matters with which 
they were directly concerned and personally involved while 
employed by the legislature. 4 
3. Sale of Goods And Services 
The Ethics Act prohibits covered individuals and 
certain political party chairmen (or their firms or associations, 
4Ethics Act Section 2.8 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73 (8)). With 
approval of the Legislative Ethics Committee, a legislative 
employee may receive compensation for performing such services if 
the participation was •primarily in a supervisory capacity [and 
the employee) was not personally involved in ... the matter to an 
important and material degree .... • Id. See also infra page A-7. 
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or corporations of which these individuals own or control 10% or 
more of the stock) from selling more than $25 worth of goods or 
services to a state agency. They are also prohibited from 
contracting for, or providing services with or to, a private 
entity when wthe power to contract, appoint or retainw on that 
entity's behalf is wexercised •.. by a state agency or officer 
thereof .w There is an exception if such goods or services are 
provided by competitive bidding. Similar prohibitions are placed 
upon political party chairmen in New York City with respect to 
contracts with agencies within the City. 5 
covered individuals are also barred from soliciting, 
accepting, or receiving a gift valued at $75.00 or more if it 
might reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended, or could 
reasonably be expected, to influence them in the performance of 
their official duties, or was •intended as a reward* for any 
official action. Offering or making such a gift is also prohib-
ited. 6 
5None, however, are placed by the Ethics Act on municipal 
officials in New York City or elsewhere in New York State. The 
New York City Charter does place prohibitions of this kind on New 
York City employees and members of the Board of Estimate and City 
Council. Section 2604(b) (1). N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 801 prohibits 
certain conflicts of interest of municipal officers and 
employees, with numerous exceptions codified in Section 802. 
Some municipal ethics codes, adopted locally pursuant to N.Y. 
Gen. Mun. Law § 806, may also contain restrictions of this kind. 
See also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 805-a. 
6Ethics Act Sections 2.4, 2.5 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §§ 
73(4),(5)). N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 805-a(l), proscribing municipal 
officers' receipt of gifts under •circumstances in which it could 
reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to influence• 
(Footnote Continued) 
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4. Financial Disclosure Provisions 
The Ethics Act imposes financial disclosure require-
ments on statewide elected officials, state officers and emplo-
yees, legislators and legislative employees, judges and judiciary 
branch employees, as well as on certain political party chair-
7 
men. The sources of personal income, the nature of investments, 
and the extent of real property holdings disclosed pursuant to 
these requirements will be made public under the Ethics Act, but 
the value of these disclosed items will not. Those required to 
file statements under the Act may seek an exemption from disclo-
sure of interests having •no material bearing• on the discharge 
of their official duties. 8 
The Ethics Act further requires political subdivisions 
(counties, cities, towns, and villages) with populations of over 
(Footnote Continued) 
them, was held to be unconstitutionally vague in People v. Moore, 
85 Misc. 2d 4, 377 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Fulton County Ct. 1975). The 
Court of Appeals, however, has not addressed the constitution-
ality of the statute. See also Binghamton Civil Service Forum v. 
City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 
482 (1978). 
7
under the Ethics Act, chairmen of state political party 
committees and political party chairmen in counties with a 
population of over 300,000 or who earn more than $30,000 are 
required to file financial disclosure statements. Thus only 
one-sixth of the 62 county chairmen in the State will be covered 
by this provision. 
8Ethics Act Sections 3, 7.17(a) (1), 9.16(a), 16.17(a), 17.4 
(N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73-a, N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(17) (a) (1), N.Y. 
Legis. Law. § 80(16) {a), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813(17) (a), N.Y. 
Jud. Law§ 211(4)). Section 2.6{a) of the Act {N.Y. Pub. Off. 
Law§ 73(6) (a)) provides that all legislative employees not 
covered by Section 73-a must file an abbreviated, less detailed 
financial disclosure statement. 
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50,000 to adopt their own financial disclosure requirements. The 
Act provides no minimum standard for these requirements, except 
that New York City must adopt forms at least as stringent as 
those contained in the Act. A political subdivision that fails 
to adopt such requirements by January 1, 1991, however, will be 
subject to the disclosure requirements contained in the Ethics 
Act. 9 Approximately 80 of the 1616 political subdivisions in New 
York State, or fewer than 5%, will be required to adopt disclo-
. t d th' . . lO sure requiremen s un er is provision. 
5. Enforcement Agencies 
The Act creates three enforcement agencies: the State 
Ethics Commission, the Legislative Ethics Committee, and the 
Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics (collec-
tively, "commissions"). 
The State Ethics Commission is made up of five members 
appointed by the Governor. The Attorney General and the Comp-
troller each nominate one member. Of the remaining three mem-
bers, no more than two may be of the same political party. At 
least two members must be individuals who do not hold public 
9Ethics Act Sections 14, 15.3 (N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§§ 811, 
812(3)). 
10This provision will, however, cover political subdivisions 
in which the greater part of New York State's population resides. 
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office, and none may hold political party office or be employed 
as a lobbyist. 
The Legislative Ethics Committee consists of eight 
members, all of whom must be legislators. Two members are 
appointed by the President pro tem of the Senate, two by the 
Speaker of the Assembly, and two each by the minority leaders of 
each house. 
There are nine members of the Temporary State Commis-
sion on Local Government Ethics, appointed by the Governor. The 
minority and majority leaders of both houses of the Legislature 
each nominate one member. Of the remaining five members, no more 
than three may be of the same political party, and at least three 
must be individuals who do not hold public office. None may hold 
political party office or be employed as a lobbyist. 
These commissions are charged with the task of enforc-
ing the law's financial disclosure and conflict of interest 
regulations. The major difference between them is jurisdiction-
al: the State Ethics Commission has jurisdiction over matters 
involving statewide elected officials, candidates for these 
offices, political party chairmen, and state officers and employ-
ees; the Legislative Ethics Committee exercises authority over 
members of the legislature, legislative employees, and candidates 
for the legislature; and the Temporary State Commission on Local 
Government Ethics is concerned with the conduct of local elected 
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officials, local political party officials, and local officers 
and employees. 
The commissions must, among other things: adopt proce-
dures governing the filing of financial disclosure statements; 
review the statements when they are filed; and determine, on 
application by the filer, whether any of the information revealed 
in disclosure statements may be withheld from public inspection. 
Each of the ethics commissions is also authorized to 
receive and investigate complaints alleging violations of the 
Ethics Act. Additionally, the commissions must render advisory 
opinions on the requirements of the Ethics Act upon the request 
of a person subject to the jurisdiction of the commission. These 
opinions are binding on the commissions (unless amended or 
revoked) in any subsequent proceeding concerning the person who 
requested the opinion, as long as that person acted in good faith 
in requesting the opinion and made no omissions or misstatements 
of material fact in the initial request. The opinions may also 
be relied upon as a defense in any criminal or civil action. 
Requests for opinions are confidential but may be published by 
the commissions as long as the name of the requesting person and 
other identifying details are omitted. 11 
11Ethics Act Sections 7, 9, 16 (N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94, N.Y. 
Legis. Law§ 80, N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813). 
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6. Advisory Councils 
The Act establishes an advisory council for each of the 
three commissions and, although there are some differences in the 
manner of their appointment, they have similar duties. Upon 
application by a reporting individual, they may permit that 
individual to delete information from the public copy of a 
financial disclosure statement upon a showing that that informa-
tion has no material bearing on the discharge of the individual's 
official duties. In addition, the councils may permit exceptions 
to the filing requirement itself with respect to information 
concerning the filer's family. If a request is denied, the filer 
must be informed of the right to appeal to the appropriate 
•parent• commission. In the event of a second adverse determina-
tion, the filer may institute an action against the commission 
under Article 78 of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Alternatively, the filer may request a 30-day period during which 
all information in the application shall remain confidential. If 
the filer resigns his or her office and holds no other office 
subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, the information is 
not made public and is expunged. 
The advisory councils may certify to the appropriate 
•parent• commission certain questions which may recur or which 
apply to a large number of covered individuals. 12 
12Ethics Act Sections 7.18, 9.17, 16.17 (N.Y. Exec. Law § 94 
(18), N.Y. Legis. Law§ 80 (17), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813 (17)). 
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7. Investigations and Penalties 
If a commission receives a financial disclosure state-
ment indicating a possible violation of the financial disclosure 
or conflicts of interest provisions of the Ethics Act, or a sworn 
complaint alleging such a violation, it must investigate. The 
commission may also decide on its own initiative to begin an 
investigation. Once an inquiry is begun, the commission must 
notify the subject of the investigation of the charges and offer 
a chance to submit a written reply. In cases in which further 
investigation is deemed justified, the commission must give the 
subject an opportunity to be heard. The subject of the investi-
gation must also be informed of the commission's rules regarding 
adjudicatory proceedings. Up to this point, the investigation is 
confidential. Where no violation is found, both the subject of 
the investigation and the complainant must be so notified. If 
the commission determines, however, that there is reasonable 
cause to believe that a violation has occurred, it must send 
notice of the determination to the subject, the complainant, and, 
in the case of a statewide elected official, both the President 
pro tem of the Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly. 13 If the 
subject is a state officer or employee, the appointing authority 
must be notified. 
13In the case of senators and assemblymen, notice goes to 
the President pro tem of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
Assembly, respectively. In the case of a legislative employee, . 
notice goes to the leader of the appropriate legislative body and 
to the appointing authority. 
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If a person files a deficient financial disclosure 
statement, or neglects to file a statement at all, the Act 
provides that the person may cure the deficiency within fifteen 
days of receiving notice from the commission. Only upon failure 
to cure during this period is a notice of delinquency issued to 
the appropriate authority. 
Additionally, the Act seems to allow an opportunity to 
•rectify• violations of the conflicts of interest laws and Code 
of Ethics provisions (Public Officers Law§§ 73 and 74), by 
providing that, if a commission determines that a •potential 
conflict of interest violation has been rectified,• it shall so 
inform the covered individual and the complainant confidentially. 
The ethics commissions are deemed to be state agencies 
under the state Administrative Procedure Act. They can assess 
civil penalties of up to $10,000 for knowing and intentional (or 
willful) violations of the Act, or they may refer violations to 
the appropriate prosecutorial agency. They cannot do both. 
Willful violations, if prosecuted, are punishable as class A 
misdemeanors. 14 
14Ethics Act Sections 2.6(c), 3.4, 7.11, 7.12, 9.10, 9.11, 
15.6, 16.11, 16.12, 16.13 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§ 73(6) (c) & 
73-a(4); N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94 (11) & (12); N.Y. Legis. Law§ 
80(10) & (11); N.Y. Gen . Mun. Law§§ 812(6) & 813(11), (12) & 
( 13)) • 
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8. Pre-Emptive Provisions 
The Ethics Act pre-empts the application of the Judici-
ary Law, the Education Law, and all other laws and disciplinary 
rules with respect to certain conduct permitted by the terms of 
the Act. As described above, the Act also effectively prohibits 
prosecution for criminal violations of the key provisions of the 
Act unless and until the appropriate ethics commission formally 
refers a matter to a prosecutor. 15 
9. Code of Ethics 
The •code of Ethics,• codified in Section 74 of the 
Public Officers Law, has not been amended in any way by the 
Ethics Act. Section 74 is a statement of ethical principles, 
couched in precatory language, which sets general standards of 
15Ethics Act Sections 2.10, 2.11, 2.14, 3.4 (N.Y. Pub. Off. 
Law§§ 73(10), (11) & (14), 73-a(4)). 
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conduct for state agency officers or employees and legislative 
16 
members or employees. 
16section 74 is not a detailed proscription of conduct; 
rather, it advises, among other things, that public officials 
should not accept employment that will impair their independence 
of judgment in the exercise of their official duties; engage in 
activities that will require them to disclose or use confidential 
information gained by virtue of their official position; engage 
in transactions when representing the State with entities in 
which they have a financial interest; or invest in enterprises 
which they know could create conflicts of interest. 
Additionally, full-time officers or employees of state 
agencies (and firms or associations of which they are members, or 
corporations in which they own or control a •substantial portion 
of stock•) are counselled not to sell goods or services to any 
entity licensed by the state agency by which they are employed. 
State employees are also enjoined to disclose financial interests 
of $10,000 or more in any activity subject to a state regulation. 
Despite the precatory language of Section 74, New York 
Executive Law § 74(2) (c) authorizes the promulgation of 
administrative rules and regulations relating to conflicts of 
interest, and knowing and intentional violation of these 
standards may result in fines, suspension, or removal from 
office. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 74(4). See generally Nicholas v. 
Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 389 N.E. 2d 1086, 416 N.Y.S. 2d 565 (1979); 
Hanley v. Wickham, 32 A.D.2d 680, 299 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dep't 
1969). 
